


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Three Years *of the* Great War

Frank H. Simonds

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Three Years *of* The Great War

A Comprehensive Review

by

FRANK H. SIMONDS

*Associate Editor of the New
York Tribune, constituting
the summaries written by him
at the end of July, 1915,
July, 1916, and July, 1917*



Frank H. Simonds

*Author of "The Great War"
"They Shall Not Pass," Etc.*

Concerning Simonds

WITH the declining importance of the war correspondent, due to the immensity and stricter censorship of modern warfare, has come the rise of the great war editor.

The new center of military information is this master student who, versed in the geography and topography of the fighting countries, and possessing an accurate estimate of the strength of the contending forces and a first-hand knowledge of the morale of the men, traces the ebb and flow of the lines on each of the fronts; watches with hawk eyes the seeming minor events that indicate a coming drive or retreat; and, with almost prophetic pen, points out what to expect shortly at a given point.

The one American editor ideally equipped for his great task is Frank H. Simonds. For years before this war Mr. Simonds was a reporter for metropolitan newspapers in positions that brought him into contact with the biggest men in this country. In Washington and Albany he acquired a political insight that proved invaluable to him when he came to study the present war where so many military movements are undertaken with an eye to purely political effect in one country or another.

For years before this war Mr. Simonds made the study of geography and military history his hobby. He pored over all available accounts of the strategic campaigns of the American Civil War and those European struggles, the Napoleonic and others, that were fought over the same ground where the front line trenches now stand.

Thus prepared, as an editorial writer on the *New York Evening Sun*, Mr. Simonds, at the outbreak of the Great War, as-

tonished the country by his keen insight into the course of events and his predictions that proved so startlingly true. He was everywhere quoted. Magazines of national circulation reprinted his comments. He wrote two volumes on "The Great War" that brought him immediate applause from military critics for their accuracy and from the man in the street for their simplicity.

In March, 1915, Mr. Simonds joined the New York *Tribune* as associate Editor, taking complete charge of its Editorial Page. His work on the *Tribune* has brought his increasing popularity with those who wish to keep in touch with the biggest thing in world history.

In the spring of 1916, Mr. Simonds went to Europe and was received by General Petain during the glorious defence of Verdun. He again visited the front early in 1917, spending nearly two months in England and with the British armies in France, being for some time the guest of General Sir Douglas Haig. America's great war critic is held as highly abroad as in his own country.

His weekly reviews of the war have made Mr. Simonds the best-known expert in the United States. Published in the New York *Tribune* and other leading papers, they have kept hundreds of thousands informed of the actual situation to date.

The following reviews of three years of the war written at the close of each period are typical examples of Mr. Simonds' military knowledge, his foresight and his clear, fascinating style. His full-page weekly war articles illustrated with large maps will continue to give his readers an accurate understanding of the current developments and events to be expected in this struggle against autocracy.

The Great War—First Year

THE purpose of this review is to summarize briefly the main military phases of the first year of the war. To do this it is perhaps simplest to accept the unity supplied by the three major campaigns, those of Germany against France, of Russia against Austria and, finally, of Germany against Russia, which is still going forward. A fourth division may be found in the attempted offensives of the Allies in the west, so far unsuccessful in the larger view, at the Dardanelles, and in the fields now invaded by Italy, where again the results are as yet without real meaning.

The effort will be made here to show what was in the minds of the high command of the armies making the several bids for decision, the extent of the success or failure, and the causes, so far as they are yet set forth in any official or unofficial but trustworthy comment. Save for the Battle of the Marne, which is, so far, the one clearly decisive engagement of the whole war, little attention will be paid to individual engagements.

I. Germany Against France

The first phase of the world war was comprehended in a tremendous effort of the whole German military establishment, save for perhaps 250,000 troops sent to hold back the first Russian columns in the east, to crush French military power, take Paris, remove the French as a factor in the present war, achieve a decision exactly similar to that won in the Franco-Prussian War and obtain it in the same time. It was of prime importance to win quickly, because there was a perfect realization in Berlin that

Austria-Hungary could not permanently deal with the Russian armies single-handed.

Since the French frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland was fortified strongly, German military chiefs recognized that it could not be forced without delays that might make it possible for Russia to dispose of Austria before France had been put out. Accordingly, the invasion of France by way of Belgium was decided upon, and at least 1,000,000 men were sent in three armies through Belgian territory, while three more of about equal strength were employed through Luxemburg, Lorraine and Alsace.

In thinking of the first campaign it is well to remember always that the Germans had but two things in mind, to destroy French armies utterly and to do this within the first six weeks of the war. The capture of forts, cities, the success in incidental engagements, was of no real meaning if the great decision was not to be had. The German strategy aimed at annihilation, expected to achieve it and conducted the operation with a disregard of all expense of life and equipment which was only conceivable as the price of a supreme success.

Conversely, the sole problem of the French in this same period was to keep their armies in being, save Paris and escape the annihilation planned by their great foe. To meet the German avalanche they had a little more than half as many troops, with British supports, which were, however, insignificant in numbers. The French were also handicapped by the fact that their mobilization was based upon the assumption that Germany would come through Alsace-Lorraine and not through neutral Belgium, and the plans could not be changed after mobilization had begun. Thus it was necessary for France to execute a complete reconcentration of her armies after the campaign had opened. But it

is necessary to recall here that the single necessity for the French was to survive the first avalanche. This was Joffre's problem, as that of von Moltke was to annihilate the French. On these terms it is possible to estimate pretty exactly the results of this first campaign, the greatest the world had ever seen in numbers, in the size of battlefields and in the losses that were suffered by all contestants.

THE BELGIAN PHASE (AUG. 4-22)

The first shots on the Belgian frontier were fired on August 4. The next day German troops reached the forts of Liège. The army was commanded by General von Emmich and numbered about 30,000 picked troops. Despite the contemporary impression, the Belgian resistance, while heroic, was wholly ineffective. Liège was occupied on August 7. For a week the Belgian commander, General Leman, held one or two of the forts west of the Meuse, but these were destroyed by the first shots of the German heavy artillery on August 14 or 15.

In the meantime German mobilization was completed, concentration took place and on August 15 the German masses were setting out on their dash to Paris. All this time there had been steady skirmishing between the field forces of the Belgians and the screen of German cavalry which was preparing the way for the coming of the armies. These skirmishes were magnified into battles by Brussels reports, but were of no real importance and ended in the complete demoralization of the Belgian army.

Once the German advance was begun it swept irresistibly forward. One force under von Kluck moved straight on Brussels; a second, under von Buelow, crossed the Meuse at Huy and advanced upon Namur and a third came through the Ardennes and struck at the line of the Meuse above Namur. Brussels fell

on August 20, the Belgian army fled to Antwerp and the German army, having passed the capital, started south for Paris. The Belgian phase ended on August 22 with the abrupt fall of Namur and the opening battles between the German armies and the Anglo-French forces of the north.

FRENCH DISASTER (AUG. 4-18)

While the Germans were coming through Belgium the French had attempted to invade Alsace-Lorraine, had been successful at the start, and then heavily beaten east of Metz and driven in disorder into French territory about Nancy. A second French offensive across the Meuse into Belgian Luxemburg had met with another defeat. At the moment when the German forces of the north struck the Allied armies along the Sambre and the Meuse from Mons to Givet the French armies from Switzerland to the Belgian frontier were retreating in disorder.

To meet the German advance through Belgium the French and British took their stand in the angle between the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. The position was naturally strong, but was based upon the Belgian fortress of Namur. To the utter amazement of the world Namur fell within a few hours, the British about Mons were struck in front and flank by overwhelming forces and the French were driven out of their positions west and south of Namur.

The opening battles of Mons and Charleroi were between some 300,000 Allied troops and 750,000 Germans. Both battles were broken off before they reached a decision, both were Allied defeats and they opened the way to the possible destruction of the whole Allied forces in the north at the moment that the French armies in the east were retreating after having been routed.

THE GREAT RETREAT (AUG. 22-SEPT. 6)

On August 22 the German armies were in full pursuit of the Allies from Switzerland to the Sambre. The great problem was now whether von Kluck could destroy the British army on the extreme left, interpose between Paris and the whole Allied battle front, cut off the retreating armies and roll them up in such an envelopment as had won the war of 1870. For the Allies the single effort was to escape the net, get south to a point where they could again put a line in front of the Germans.

All this week the British army occupied the danger point, was almost enveloped, escaped only by retreating day and night, lost heavily in men and equipment, but finally escaped after fighting a number of rear guard battles. The French armies, on their part, retreated with greater deliberation and were never in great danger.

By September 1 the French and British were once more in line from the Vosges to the walls of Paris, but all Northern France was now in German hands and a victorious German army was assailing Nancy. It was no longer possible for the Allies to retreat without abandoning Paris, and the Germans, still on schedule time, were within sight of the outer forts of the French capital.

BATTLE OF THE MARNE (SEPT. 7-10)

At the opening of this great battle the French held a line from Paris to Verdun, curving deeply to the south. On this line Joffre had been concentrating his forces since the opening defeats. Now the Germans were in turn threatened with envelopment from Paris and from Verdun, and about Paris a new French army had been collected, which energetically struck east upon von Kluck's flank.

But the decisive point in the Battle of the Marne was about La Fère Champenoise, and the first heavy blow was struck here by General Foch. On September 9 the whole French line, after two weeks of steady retreat, suddenly struck back, defeated the Germans in a number of terrific engagements and drove all the German armies from Lorraine to Lagny back in a complete defeat which amounted to a rout at certain points. At the moment when Berlin was waiting to hear of the fall of Paris all the German armies were in retreat. France was not to be overwhelmed. In this battle more than 3,000,000 were engaged, the losses were not less than 500,000 and the battle front was nearly two hundred miles long.

ON THE AISNE (SEPT. 13-OCT. 9)

In the opening days of the second week in September there was hope in Allied capitals that the Germans might be driven out of France, but it proved vain. Between the Marne and the Aisne the Germans rallied. The fall of Maubeuge freed a German army which came south and reinforced von Kluck. Allied advance was stopped at this stream and in the next few days the Germans established a line from the Oise at Noyon to the Argonne. All Allied efforts to drive them failed.

The French then made a desperate effort to turn the Germans out by attacking their right flank and turning it, coming in about St. Quentin. But this failed, and in a few more days the line had begun to mount toward Belgium, each General Staff meeting the other's efforts with new battalions. Meantime the Germans directed their attention toward making their position in Belgium secure by besieging Antwerp, which fell after a ten-days' siege on October 9.

Just before this surrender the British had been taken out of their trenches along the Aisne and sent north to fill the gap between the French battle line and the sea. Their objective was Antwerp, but the fall of this town ruined their plans and they were again left to face an overwhelming attack by new German armies, supported only by the beaten Belgian army, which had escaped from Antwerp and come south through Ostend to the Yser River north of Dunkirk.

BATTLES OF FLANDERS (OCT. 21, NOV. 15)

German effort to crush France had failed. There remained the chance of capturing the Channel ports, Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk; straightening the western front and shortening it, preparing the way for submarine and Zeppelin campaigns against England and completing the conquest of Belgium.

Accordingly, vast new forces were sent into the line between Lille and Ostend and a general German advance in masses was begun against the thin line of British and Belgian troops on this front. A month of desperate fighting followed. The Belgians, heavily attacked, just managed to cling to the Yser line, after opening the sluices and flooding the region. The British held Ypres despite a 50 per cent. loss and against three or four times their number. The struggle was over by November 15.

In sum, then, the first German offensive was decisively beaten at the Marne. France was neither destroyed nor seriously crippled. Her losses in captured and killed and wounded combined probably equalled those of the Germans, who, as the attacking force, lost heavily. Not less than a million men were put out in this opening phase. But at the end the Germans had won only a few thousand square miles of territory in France, they had failed to take Paris

or the Channel ports and they could no longer afford to neglect the Russian menace. From November 15 to July 25 the western campaign from the German side has been defensive, save for local attacks. It has become a mere war of trenches.

II. Russia Against Austria

Russian mobilization being slower than German, Berlin had calculated that it would be at least six weeks before Germany need fear any attack upon the east, since the Austrian armies might be expected to hold back the first advances of the Russians. The Russian problem was to dispose of Austria before Germany could get back from her great campaign in France. Thus all the efforts of Russian high command were at first directed against Austria. But the opening successes of Germany in France led to the appeal for Russian intervention against Germany, which modified both German and Russian plans and not impossibly contributed to the ultimate failure of both.

In examining the Russian operations, therefore, it is necessary to think both of the great movement against Austria and the subsidiary operations against Germany, first offensive and later defensive, when Germany began to help her stricken ally.

In the opening days of the war the Austrians sent their main forces to Galicia and attempted to invade Poland from Galicia with one force, while holding the Galician front east of Lemberg with another. Their operations were handicapped by the terrible defeat they suffered almost at the outset of the war at the hands of the Serbians along the Jedar and by the additional fact that some of the best Austrian troops and most of their heavy artillery were borrowed by the Germans for their operations in France and Belgium.

TANNENBERG (SEPT. 1)

While Russian and Austrian mobilization was still incomplete the Allied disasters in the west drove Paris and London to ask Petrograd to invade East Prussia to compel Germany to recall troops from France. Accordingly two Russian armies, one from Warsaw, the other from the Niemen, were sent into East Prussia. Both won initial successes, and the Niemen army, having defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen, approached Koenigsberg. But the second, having reached Allenstein, was enveloped by Hindenburg in the swamp districts, forced into the marshes and practically annihilated. More than 100,000 troops were put out in this fight, and the second Russian army escaped only by rapid retreat.

The disaster of Tannenberg took place on September 1. It was a defeat exceeding in proportions any achievement of Napoleon, but it unquestionably contributed to the success of the Allies at the Marne, since the Germans were compelled to recall troops from the west and divert reinforcements. In the operations East Prussia was devastated and the refugees fled as far as Berlin. On the other hand, Russia lost one of its best armies and an incalculable amount of artillery and munitions. It was an expensive sacrifice.

LEMBERG (SEPT. 1)

But the East Prussian operation was only a minor incident. The main Russian forces had already entered Galicia from the east and at the moment of Tannenberg had attacked and routed the main Austrian armies, driving them through Lemberg and as far as Jaroslav in utter rout, taking thousands of prisoners and

immense stores of ammunition. A similar fate overtook the army which the Austrians had sent north against Lublin.

Thus, while the Germans were failing in their grandiose effort for a decision in France, the Russians were achieving what now appeared to be a real decision over Austria in Galicia. Coupled with the Serbian victory at the Jedar, the Lemberg disaster seemed to promise the speedy disintegration of the heterogeneous Austrian armies. With her French hopes turned to ashes, Germany had now to face east to save her ally.

THE FIRST WARSAW DRIVE (OCT. 1-20)

German attempt to save Austria took the shape of a sudden drive at Warsaw, through Central Poland. Russia had made two great efforts, the chief endeavor directed against Austria, which had succeeded, the second against East Prussia, which had failed. But in doing this she had left Central Poland bare of troops, and Germany now struck straight through the unguarded center at Warsaw in an attempt to seize this great fortress town before Russia could get back from Galicia a sufficient force to check the thrust.

This drive began in the first days of October, was directed by Hindenburg and almost succeeded. German troops actually reached the suburbs of Warsaw, and its fall was expected. But Russian reinforcements arrived in time, the German flank was turned and a speedy retreat was necessary. Without any real battle the Germans swiftly and succinctly flowed back across their own frontiers.

Momentarily, however, they had achieved their purpose in relieving the Austrians. The Russians, having sent corps to Warsaw, were compelled to retreat behind the San. Przemyśl, which

had been besieged, was relieved, and for the moment Austria was saved. As an example of daring and successful strategy the first drive at Warsaw, although it failed to take the city, cannot be praised too highly.

LODZ (Nov. 19)

The pause in the Galician campaign, however, proved only momentary. While the Germans were retreating from Warsaw, the Russians renewed their offensive, recrossed the San, reinvaded Przemyśl, penetrated to the suburbs of Cracow and approached and even passed the Carpathian barrier, sending Cossack raiders over into Hungary. A new effort to save Austria was inevitable.

The second effort was far more considerable. It began in the early days of November and was made by a great German army, many corps being recalled from the west, where the Battles of Flanders were ending and the whole campaign falling to trench war.

Russian forces, pursuing the Germans retreating from Warsaw, had approached the Posen and Silesian frontiers and were across the Wartha. Hindenburg now gathered up his armies, which were facing the Russians west of the Wartha, moved them rapidly over strategic railroads to the north and sent them in upon the Russian flank in a desperate effort to cut the Russians off from Warsaw, envelop them and either surround them or drive them south away from the railroads.

Again the Germans almost succeeded. At one time they actually interposed between the Russians and their base, cutting the railroad, northeast of Lodz. For days a desperate struggle went on about Lodz. In the end, after suffering terrific losses, the Russians were saved by reinforcements brought from Warsaw and were able to get back behind the Bzura-Rawka rivers west of War-

saw and there to repulse all German attacks. By December 1 the front in this sector had become fixed on lines it was to hold until July.

PRZEMYSL AND THE CARPATHIANS (DEC. TO MAY).

Once more the Russian armies in Galicia had been compelled to retire in consequence of a German offensive in Poland. But this time they came back only to Tarnow and took up a strong position behind the Dunajec-Biala rivers. Henceforth their main effort was directed at forcing the passes of the Carpathians and breaking into the Hungarian Plain. To do this it was essential to reduce the fortress of Przemyśl, which commands the main railways and roads of Galicia. From January 1 to May 1 the Galician campaign was marked by a slow but steady advance of the Russians toward and through the mountains, halted frequently by desperate Austro-German offensives, for German troops and officers were now sent to stiffen the shaken Hapsburg forces.

Austrian resistance was materially strengthened also by the recall of three corps which had been dispatched to Serbia to share in the invasion of that kingdom. This invasion had passed Belgrade and seemed about to crush Serbia, when the recall of Austrian troops made possible a new Serbian offensive, and the Austrian invading forces were terribly beaten in the first days of December about Valiev● and driven out of the kingdom.

Przemyśl fell on March 22, and immediately thereafter Russia made her final bid for a decision in the east. The surrender had eliminated 125,000 Austrian troops and freed many more Russians. In the opening days of April the whole Russian battle line along the Carpathians swept forward. For four weeks the fighting was terrific and the progress favorable to the Russians.

But by May 1 they were brought to a complete halt, having still failed to enter the Hungarian Plain. Their hope of a decision had also failed. They had been unable to crush Austria, as Germany had failed to crush France. It was now time for a new German effort.

To complete the review of events in the east it is necessary to mention the great German victory in the Mazurian Lakes region on February 10, which terminated a Russian counter-offensive in East Prussia, designed to relieve Russian armies in Poland and Galicia by recalling German troops. A huge number of prisoners were claimed by the Germans, who once more demonstrated their complete superiority to the Russians in the field.

III. Germany Against Russia

All hope of a decision in the west ended with the repulse of the Germans in Flanders in November; in fact, it had practically terminated when the beaten German masses had retreated from the Marne. Germany had undertaken to dispose of France at one blow, and France had escaped. Belgium and the industrial regions of Northeastern France remained in German hands, a rich prize, protected by the strong defensive lines which the German armies held from Switzerland to the sea. But there was no longer any prospect that a new German offensive could reach Paris or crush the Allies.

On the other hand, it might still be possible to win the war if Russia could be eliminated. If Germany, while holding all of her western conquests, could dispose of Russia as she had hoped to dispose of France, there was still time to win a great triumph, make peace on terms which would be wholly advantageous, if not as favorable as had been hoped for in August, 1914.

While the world was talking of a spring drive of the Allies Germany was steadily preparing for a great offensive of the combined Austro-German forces, which should relieve the Russian menace to Hungary, clear Galicia, take Warsaw and, if possible, crush Russian military power so completely that Russia would ask for peace or cease to be a factor for many months.

The long series of French offensives in the west in the late winter and spring had demonstrated that the German lines would hold. The failure of the British to get up Kitchener's million or to provide the ammunition necessary for a successful advance offered the new chance. In April Germany turned her attention to Russia with the same purpose and the same possibilities that led to the earlier offensive against France.

GALICIA (MAY AND JUNE).

At the opening of the great German offensive against Russia the armies of the Czar in Galicia were in the Carpathians, their flank toward Germany protected by strong defensive works behind the Dunajec-Biala rivers.

The first operation was directed against this flank, which was suddenly struck by a huge army under Mackensen provided with an enormous artillery train. In a few days the entire front crumpled up, uncovering the rear of the armies in the Carpathians. Along the Dunajec the Russians suffered a real disaster, losing thousands in prisoners. In the first stages of their retreat more thousands were captured and the whole Carpathian army was threatened in front by the Austrian armies coming from Hungary, in flank and rear by the German troops coming east in Galicia

Efforts to stand at the Wislok, the San and at the Grodek lakes failed. Although the Russian resistance steadily stiffened,

the German advance could not be checked. Jaroslav Przemysl and finally Lemberg were recaptured and the Russians were driven into Poland and east toward the Bessarabian frontier. All but a thin strip of Galicia was reconquered, after having been occupied by Russia since September.

Russian disaster was explained by the lack of ammunition and by the great superiority of German artillery. Probably this explains the rapidity of the débâcle, but the Russians were clearly outnumbered, outgeneralled and outfought.

THE THIRD DRIVE AT WARSAW (JULY).

Once Galicia was cleared the full extent of German purpose was revealed. Glance at the map and it will be seen that Russian Poland extends into German and Austrian territory, which grips it something like a pair of jaws. Warsaw, the western-most fortress of the Russian defensive line, is outflanked by German East Prussian territory and by Austrian Galician districts.

Very shortly it became clear that the plan of the Austro-German commanders was to attack Warsaw frontally along the familiar Rawka-Bzura front and at the same time to attack the defensive lines that covered the railroads from Kiev, Moscow and Petrograd to the Polish capital. If these lines in the rear fell before Warsaw was evacuated all the Russians west of the closing jaws would be cut off, surrounded, ultimately captured; the greater part of Russian military strength would be eliminated.

If Warsaw were evacuated in time the Russian front would be thrown back from the Vistula to the Bug, the Austro-German allies would gain a tremendously strong defensive line, having conquered most of Poland, and they might expect that Russia would seek peace, or at least be compelled to conduct a relatively

harmless defensive operation far within her own territory for many months.

The main object was, of course, to dispose of the Russian armies by enveloping and capturing them. This would in all probability mean a decision, but short of this, if the Russian armies were completely routed, with Austrian and German territory freed of invaders, with victorious German armies standing in Belgium, Poland and Northern France, Germany might expect to hear from her foes some proposals for peace, which would be based on the full recognition of her conquests and achievements.

These lines were written with the fate of Warsaw still in doubt. The Austrian and German jaws are still closing steadily behind Warsaw, but the Russian resistance is desperate and so far sustained. At the moment Germany is as near to a decision as she was in France in September of last year. But if the Russian armies hold, as the French did at the Marne, or escape, as they did in the Great Retreat, Germany will miss the great decision, even if she takes Warsaw.

IV. Allied Offensives

The first campaign in the west ended with the Battles of Flanders on November 15. It left the Allied armies victorious, to the extent that they had parried the great German design to dispose of France. It left them holding lines which had endured the shock of terrific attack, but it left them shattered and to some extent disorganized. The first British expeditionary army had disappeared in casualties. France had lost at least three-quarters of a million men. It was necessary to reorganize all the Allied armies, to attempt to overtake the Germans, whose preparation and foresight had almost won them the decision.

Once this reorganization was achieved and preparation began to go forward it was necessary to attempt offensive operations not alone to get the Germans out of France, where their hold upon the mineral and industrial districts was crippling the French, but also to relieve the pressure upon Russia and thus assist the great Russian offensive in Galicia. These attempts stretch from January to July and are, with one exception, an uninterrupted series of local successes, yet wholly barren of any but the smallest local advantage. Great as is the place they have occupied in the news of recent months, tremendous as have been the losses to the forces engaged, they have left the battle lines hardly changed and require no detailed examination.

FRENCH OFFENSIVES (JANUARY TO JULY)

The main effort in the west has, of course, been made by the French. In the past six months a sustained attack has been made in each sector. Thus in January the first offensive broke out north of the Aisne and east of Soissons. Local advances were made, but a flood carried away the Aisne bridges and the French were obliged to evacuate not only the ground gained, but the ground held by the British in the early days of the general Allied advance after the Battle of the Marne. This was the one complete failure.

In February a new effort was made in Alsace and French troops broke out of the Thur Valley below Than and touched the Alsatian Plain. Their advance was checked within sight of Mülhausen and they were crowded back to the hills. The operation terminated with real gain to the French, but they failed utterly to gain a foothold on the plain.

A third effort in Champagne led to much more severe fighting and to terrific losses on both sides. Not less than half a

million men fought for nearly a month on the narrow front between Rheims and the Argonne, the French striving to get hold of the railroad, which supplied the German front west of Vouziers. Slight progress and actual failure to attain the object marked this effort. A fourth venture about St. Mihiel brought back only insignificant profits.

The most successful French advance was made in May, north of Arras, and resulted in the capture of the Lorrette heights and a number of villages west of Lens. But once more the main objective was not attained. The city of Lens did not fall and the German lines, thinned to reinforce the eastern armies, were not broken. In fact, the Germans were able to organize a counter-offensive and win back considerable lost ground. These various offensives cost the French not less than 750,000 in casualties and achieved no material advantage.

BRITISH FAILURE (NOVEMBER TO JULY)

As to the British efforts since the Battles of Flanders, they may be comprehended in the simple statement that the British army has been unable to accomplish any serious offensive result since the middle of last November. The single ambitious bid for success at Neuve Chapelle in March ended in a terribly expensive local victory, but the gain here was offset by loss of trenches in the Second Battle of Ypres in April. A determined effort to support the French operations about Arras failed completely because of lack of ammunition.

Since March the British, now numbering perhaps half a million, have held their ground with little but trench fighting, in which their losses have been heavy. Not less than 300,000 British have now been killed, wounded or captured in the western field. But

the failure of the government to provide ammunition has halted, and still holds up, any British offensive. All talk of a "Spring Drive" has proved mere moonshine, and there remains some doubt as to whether the British will be able to undertake any serious offensive before next Spring.

THE DARDANELLES (FEBRUARY-JULY)

Three circumstances produced the Allied offensive designed to take Constantinople, by forcing the Dardanelles. Turkey's entrance into the war in November had closed Russia's Black Sea ports. Winter was sealing up the Arctic and Pacific ports. Russia's need for munitioning was plain. This was the chief circumstance. Again, Turkish troops were undertaking an offensive against Egypt which threatened British power at the very keystone of the imperial arch. Finally, the fall of Constantinople was bound to exercise a profound influence upon Italy and the Balkan States.

The first attempt was made by the Anglo-French fleet without land forces. The operation began on February 19, was marked by initial successes, and was completely checked by the sinking of three battleships on March 18. What many critics had foretold had now happened; it had again been demonstrated that a naval operation of this sort without the help of landing forces could not succeed. It was necessary to have recourse to a new expedition; the Turks were warned in advance of what was coming and Allied prestige in the Balkans was severely shattered. On the other hand, Italian participation was hastened and Turkey's attack upon Egypt ended.

A month later an Anglo-French expeditionary army was landed on the Gallipoli peninsula, after an engagement which

brought heavy casualties to the invaders. For many weeks thereafter the land forces were unable to make any advance. The support of the fleet was hindered by the operations of a German submarine, which scored on two more battleships. Only in recent weeks has there been progress by the Allies, and they have not yet reached the first permanent position of the Turks.

Whether the Dardanelles expedition was wise or foolish, a point much debated, it is plain that it has been badly managed, has so far failed to make any serious progress and that the ultimate capture of Constantinople is still open to question. On the other hand, it is necessary to recognize that the failure of Germany to take Warsaw, or even in taking Warsaw to capture the Russian armies, if followed by the fall of Constantinople, would mean that the German attempt to dispose of Russia had terminated, for once the Dardanelles are forced Russia will be able to munition and equip her millions, who are only waiting for arms. The fall of Constantinople will necessarily settle the attitude of the Balkans, certainly bring Greece into the anti-German line, and probably Rumania. Allied defeat, on the contrary, will mean, if not a disaster, an irremediable repulse. At the close of the first year Warsaw and Constantinople are the critical points in the situation.

ITALIAN OPERATIONS (MAY 23-JULY 23)

Italy declared war upon Austria on May 23. The nature of her frontier, hemmed in by the Austrian mountains from the Isonzo to Switzerland, her northern provinces open to attack from the fortified places of the Austrian Tyrol, made it inevitable that her efforts for many months would be confined to attempts to clear her own frontiers of the Austrians and close the gateways leading to her own regions and held by her foes. Such offensives as she

could undertake in addition would naturally be directed at Trieste and the Italian-speaking districts east of her frontiers.

At the close of two months of war Italy is still striving to penetrate into the Trentino about the fortress of Trent, to cut the railroad lines serving the Austrian Tyrol by the Pusterthal, to surround and reduce the whole Tyrolean salient south of the Brenner Pass. So far she has made slight but unimportant progress, and is still outside the first lines of Austrian defence in the Adige Valley, along the Pusterthal and south of the Stelvio.

Between the Julian Alps and the sea, on the front from Tolmino to Nebresina, Italian troops have in several places passed the Isonzo, have taken Montfalcone and Gradisca, and are now pressing in upon Gorizia. Here Italian troops have encountered the first line of Austrian defences, and have for many days been engaged in a severe and expensive conflict. It is not yet clear whether the Italians have made the progress their bulletins claim; if they have, the fall of Gorizia and the capture of Trieste are at hand.

But it is well to recall that these successes will not have any serious effect upon Austrian defence, and the road to Vienna will still remain barred by many forts and mountains, while, until the Trentino salient is reduced, Italy will always have to fear a German offensive from the Brenner. As yet, then, the Italian campaign has but begun, and the difficulties of the territory make it unlikely that Italy can exercise any great influence upon the whole combat for many weeks to come. Certainly she has not been able to force the Austrians to recall their masses from the Warsaw drive.

Summary

Of the four major efforts described above, the first, the German attack on France, failed to dispose of France. Its initial successes were due to the violation of the Belgian frontier, and when the French army had been reconcentrated it outfought the German, heavily defeated it, but in its turn failed to force the Germans out of a large district of Northern France, which had been occupied in the dash from Belgium.

The French achievement was wholly unexpected to the Germans and remains an enduring monument both to French soldiers and to the French command. In this campaign the British part was slight until the Battles of Flanders, but here the British won a remarkable triumph against great odds and saved the Channel ports. German failure was not due to bad generalship or incidental mistakes; it was due to the amazing French rally and to the fact that what had been attempted was beyond the capacity even of Germans. But the nearness to victory seems to have justified the risk taken.

The Russian offensive failed because of the ability of the Germans to reinforce their ally. Whenever the Russians had only the Austrians to deal with they were invariably successful, and in September were on the point of crushing all Austrian military strength. But against the Germans they proved inferior troops, successful only in defensive lines. The final disaster and retreat from Galicia were due in large part to the failure of their supplies of ammunition and their lack of heavy artillery. But it is necessary to point out that it was the Germans who finally defeated the great Russian effort.

Of the Allied offensive in the West little need be said. The simple fact seems to be that the trench fighting has shown the

extreme difficulty of making a successful advance; the Germans have simply dug themselves into Northern France, and are able to supply the men and ammunition to meet any offensive. The greatness of the French losses and the concomitant failure of the British to get up men or feed their guns explains Allied failure in this field, and there is no present promise of a change. German defence here has been as brilliantly successful as the operations against Russia.

Of the fourth major campaign, that against Russia, it is only possible to say that it is still going forward, and that in its earlier stages it has been as successful as was the advance on Paris before the Battle of the Marne. It is chiefly noteworthy now as demonstrating the enormous resources of Germany in men and munitions, the folly of earlier predictions of approaching German exhaustion and the comparative soundness of German confidence that victory for them is still possible or even likely.

In its first year the Great War has been Napoleonic in character, but no Napoleon has appeared. Germany has displayed the same ability to meet Europe in arms that France displayed from 1792 to 1814. All prospect of early peace seems to have been disposed of by the absence of any really decisive result in any field. Only a tremendous Russian disaster can now modify the general expectation that the war will continue for one or two years.

Finally, it is accurate to say that in the military operations in Europe all the real advantage has lain with the Germans. They have failed in their greatest undertaking, but they have cleared their own frontiers, and are now fighting in Poland, Belgium and France. Their armies have shown no sign of exhaustion or loss of morale. They have won victories which will forever be memorable.

The Great War—Second Year

THE first year of the Great War was marked by three well defined campaigns: the opening attack upon France, with its Belgian prelude, which began at Liège and culminated in the defeat at the Marne and the engagements terminating in the Battles of Flanders, by which the deadlock of trench war was made absolute from the sea to Switzerland; the Russian attack upon Austria, which began in the great victory before Lemberg, was continued by the subsequent victories in Galicia and the Carpathians, until in the closing days of April Russia stood at the edge of the Hungarian plains and but a few miles east of Cracow; the German attack upon Russia, which began with the overwhelming victory at the Dunajec about May 1 and was still continuing in victory on the first anniversary of the coming of Armageddon.

The history of the second year has been marked by five equally well defined major campaigns: the continuation and culmination of the great German attack upon Russia; the successful defensive stand of Germany in the west from August, 1915, to February, 1916, and her victorious resistance in the Battles of Loos and Champagne; the splendidly successful Austro-German drive through Serbia to the frontiers of Greece and Bulgaria; the second German attack upon France in a campaign for Verdun; finally, as the year closes, the beginning of a grand concentric Allied attack upon Germany and Austria, which has only just opened, but has already deprived Germany and her ally of the offensive on all fronts for the first time in the entire conflict.

Accepting these divisions as the basis for a review of the year and ignoring for the most part the minor and subsidiary opera-

tions, I mean now rapidly to survey these four great German campaigns and touch somewhat briefly upon the Allied attack, which is just beginning and has as yet attained no decisive result in the larger sense, either in the East or the West, although in the former field its progress has been greater than any other advance on the Allied side during the whole year.

I. Germany and Russia

The last days of July, 1915, saw the Austro-German drive against Russia in full swing. The fate of Warsaw was in doubt when the military critics were casting the balance for the first year, but it was not long to be in doubt. In rapid succession the fortresses that barred the advance of Hindenburg from East Prussia fell; Mackensen stormed on between the Pripet Marshes and the Vistula. Warsaw fell, Ivangorod, Novo-Georgievsk followed the fate of Maubeuge and Liège, Warsaw was evacuated and the whole Russian line reeled backward to Brest-Litovsk and Kovno.

But there was no halting here. North and south the peril of envelopment continued, and so the Russian army went back behind the Dwina, behind the Pinsk Marshes, and the Volhynian fortresses of Dubno and Lutsk fell to the Central Powers. Lemberg was lost, and there was left to Russia of all the fruits of her great Galician campaign only a tiny sliver of Austrian territory, the Tarnopol district.

August saw the whole world watching to know if the Russian army, the main army retiring from Warsaw and Vilna, would be enveloped and captured. A Sedan ten times magnified seemed imminent, and for a time German cavalry were across the only line of retreat of the greatest Russian army. But the Russians escaped, and in a few more weeks the Eastern campaign had come

to a deadlock, to a state of balance and a condition of trench conflict like the Western.

Well might the Germans and the Austrians acclaim their stupendous achievement. A hundred thousand square miles of Russian territory, holding before the war over fifteen millions of people, had been conquered. Prisoners to the number of more than a million had been captured. Guns, supplies beyond estimate, had fallen into their hands. No campaign of Napoleon's had been on such a scale and no success of Napoleon's had won undisputed control of so much of the territory of one of the great powers of his own time.

A STUPENDOUS SUCCESS THAT FAILED

Not unnaturally Vienna and Berlin proclaimed that the Russian phase of the war was over. Russia had received a blow from which it would take her years to recover and she had passed out of the reckoning for the term of the present war. Indeed the press was filled with the reports that Russia was seeking a separate peace. At no time since the Battle of the Marne had the fortunes of the Central Powers seemed so prosperous, and the German press promised its readers a victorious peace before snow flew.

Yet the truth was quite different. Russian armies had been terribly defeated, but they had retained their form and escaped destruction or capture. As for Russian purpose, in the hour of dejection the Czar himself took the command of his armies, sent the Grand Duke to the Caucasus and staked his dynasty on the continuance of the war and the restoration of Russian military power. Whether his act was spontaneous or the result of the impulse that sprang from the Russian people we cannot know, but the fact is that it was the first step in the wonderful renaissance of

Russia, the consequences of which are now unfolded to a whole world and recognized by a Berlin that marvels as it confesses the mistakes of its calculations of the previous year.

And in this measure the German drive at Russia failed as the German drive at France had failed. France had parried the blow at the Marne and won the precious time necessary to reorganize her own military resources and obtain the help of a Britain still for long months to be unready.

Bloody battles at the Dwina, like those at the Yser, failed to change the Eastern situation, and the effort to get Riga failed as the struggle for Calais had failed. Autumn saw the end of German effort in the East. From the Carpathians to the Gulf of Riga the lines were to stand unchanged until the Russian flood, gathering behind this dike, should once more burst through and overflow into Galicia.

The real significance of the German failure against Russia was to be appreciated but tardily by a world justly impressed by the magnitude of the conquests in territory and by the splendor of the achievements of German generals and soldiers on the field. For many months France and Britain, quite as much as Germany, were convinced that Russia had shot her bolt, and a period of depression set in which was to endure for many months. Yet not impossibly the failure of the Central Powers in the summer campaign may be reckoned hereafter as the beginning of the end.

II. Germany's Western Stand

The closing days of September saw the long promised Allied attack upon the German lines in the West. After many months of preparation, after a relative quiet which had lasted since the desperate and abortive French efforts in Artois in May and June,

the French in Champagne, the British in Artois launched terrific attacks.

In ten days of bitter fighting the French advanced some three miles on a front of eighteen, took above 25,000 prisoners and many guns; they penetrated two lines of German trenches and at one point actually broke through the third and last.

But the result was nothing. The German line was restored, the French attacks were beaten down, the whole offensive was really over in three days, and in a week the world knew that the French had failed, although the considerable number of prisoners and the large capture of guns misled many into estimating as a victory what had been a defeat, for the German line held.

In Artois the British had fared even less well. Their initial success was considerable. There was a moment when the capture of Lens seemed inevitable, but old faults reappeared. The blunders of Neuve Chapelle were repeated at Loos; supports did not come up; ground won had to be surrendered; for great sacrifices in life there was little to show. The failure at Loos cost Marshal Sir John French his command and it condemned the British army to inaction, the British people to depression for many months. It was the beginning of a long series of disasters and reverses.

Here, then, was one more German success. The German lines had held, although masses of German troops had been sent to the East in the great attack upon Russia. Some of these had now to be recalled, and the failure in the East may have been influenced in a small measure by the Allied pressure in the West, but only a little, for Russia had practically escaped when the attack began.

Allied failure in the West was a plain testimony to the fact that Britain was not yet ready, that France alone could not free

her own territory; it finally denied all the hopes and claims of the Allies that France would be freed, Belgium liberated, in 1915. The spring drive, so long forecast, came only in the closing days of September and had terminated in failure before October began.

German failure in the East had been strategic, her tactical victory had been overwhelming; that is, she had failed to capture or destroy the Russian armies, but she had beaten them in every battle and had gathered in great booty in men, in guns, in territory. The Allied failure was both tactical and strategic; it was absolute, not relative; and conversely German success in the West was absolute, because Germany had there obtained exactly what she fought for.

III. Germany Goes South

Meantime a new situation demanded German attention. The Allied landing at Gallipoli in the spring of the year had imperilled Constantinople. The Turk was making the finest fight in his splendid fighting history, but isolated from his allies by a hostile Serbia and an unfriendly Rumania, lacking in munitions and in guns, he was slowly giving evidences of an increasing weakness which might bring collapse.

Accordingly Germany and Austria planned and executed the most brilliant and successful campaign of the war. While Allied diplomatists bargained with Greece and Bulgaria and restrained Serbian soldiers, who were eager to attack Bulgaria before she mobilized, Germany concentrated a great army on the Serbian frontier along the Danube and the Drina, gave the command to the ever victorious Mackensen and prepared to open the road to Stamboul, to Cairo and to India, as German prophets proclaimed.

At the agreed moment Bulgaria mobilized and attacked

Serbia, Greece mobilized and remained neutral, Venizelos was ousted from power and the Serbian ally was left to perish under the threefold blow that was now to fall. And, brave as was the Serbian resistance, the fall was immediate. Austrian and German armies pushed south and east, Bulgarian armies entered Nish and swept Macedonia. An Anglo-French army arrived too late to cover the retreat of the Serbs by the Vardar and only a broken fraction escaped to the Albanian coast and found asylum in Corfu. Serbia and Montenegro were completely conquered and occupied, and the Central Powers paused only in sight of Salonica, where the Allied army stood, as Wellington's army had stood behind the lines of Torres Vedras when Napoleon swept the Iberian Peninsula.

ON THE ROAD TO WORLD POWER

The immediate consequences of this successful campaign, which was as short as it was decisive, were enormous. The Gallipoli campaign came to an abrupt standstill, and the army, which had been, according to Churchill, within a mile of complete success, was now exposed to deadly peril, from which it was to escape with difficulty and only by ignominious retreat a few months later.

A British army, advancing up the Tigris Valley, was presently to meet disaster and be compelled to surrender, because a great Turkish army, munitioned and captained by Germans, was freed to deal with it. The peril of invasion was to approach Suez and threaten Egypt, while Mahometan tribes in the desert were to begin the attack in the rear. Russian armies in the Caucasus were to be halted and turned back, and Teuto-Turkish activity was to extend to Persia and win brief success.

Berlin now proclaimed that Britain was to be brought to

terms by the threat at Suez, the "heel of the British Achilles." British prestige in the whole East was to suffer, and the disaster at Gallipoli, the surrender of Kut-el-Amara, were to abase Britain in her own and the world's eyes as she had not been abased in a century.

For the moment, too, Germany had broken the ring of steel about her; she had opened her road to the East; she had bound Byzantium to Berlin and to Bagdad by the railroad she had been constructing in the years of peace. Napoleon at Wagram did not seem more sure of world power and European supremacy than did William II. in the days immediately following the Balkan campaign, when the prospectuses of his statesmen and his journalists dazzled the world and silenced, or all but silenced, the Allied voices.

BUT NO VICTORIOUS PEACE

And yet the actual results of the Balkan success were pitifully small, measured by the situation nine months later. An Allied army forming at Salonica acted as a restraining force and defended Egypt from the Chalcidice. A minor attack upon Suez ended miserably. In due course of time the Grand Duke stepped forward and, capturing Trezibond and Erzerum, threatened Anatolia from the landward side and swept through most of Armenia. Egypt was not conquered by invasion, nor did there come that internal revolution that Berlin so confidently forecast. Turkey was saved temporarily; the Gallipoli and Mesopotamian campaigns of the British were brought to nothing—to worse than nothing; Bulgaria was enlisted and Greece kept outside the Allied camp; Serbia and Montenegro were transformed into new Belgiums, and Austria swept down through Albania and shepherded the Italian forces into Avlona. But this was all.

Germany had proclaimed that she would find victorious peace in Constantinople, as she had proclaimed that it was to be won in Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. But there was no peace, and the Allies at Salonica opened a new front, requiring fresh German and Austrian garrisons. The Balkan Peninsula became for the Germans what the Spanish had been for Napoleon, and Salonica at the present hour continues to recall Lisbon and the lines of Torres Vedras, although Greece still refuses the rôle of Portugal.

IV. The Second Attack on France

Peace—victorious peace—having still escaped her, Germany turned all her energies to forging one more thunderbolt. Her hands were now free to deal with France again. Russia, weakened and bound by an Arctic winter, was out of the war for many months, if not forever. Britain was still unready, palpably unready, Germany reasoned. Salonica was claiming British and French corps. There was time before Russia could "come back," before Britain could get ready, to make a final, supreme effort against France and deal with her and dispose of her.

So from November to late February Germany prepared that gigantic attack upon Verdun which in the last week of February suddenly claimed the attention of the world and for many weeks seemed certain to end in a crushing French defeat.

But Verdun, after the first chaos, indecision and blundering, held. The broken lines were destroyed; Castelnau, Pétain, Balfourier, came, and came in time. Before the old forts a second line was erected and the German advance was halted. The repulse of March 9 was fatal to German hopes for a sudden and sweeping victory, a piercing of the line, such as France had sought and missed in Champagne in September. The repulse of April 9 ended

the possibility of success by any sudden and tremendous general thrust. Henceforth Verdun fell to the level of a siege operation and Germany advanced by yards over mountains of her own dead, while on the hills across the Meuse new French lines sprang up until the Verdun salient became the strongest sector in the French front.

Still Germany persisted and persists. Her generals and her statesmen reasoned that France, wearied of the conflict, unaided yet by British counter attack, would give over the struggle; the battle for Verdun became an assault upon French confidence, endurance, nerves, and as such it endured for five months and continues; but now it has fallen from the highest estate in a world war, the focal point in the attention of a whole planet, and become an almost forgotten detail, as remote as Przemyśl.

Coincident with the German attack upon France, Austria launched a drive at Italy only less powerful and wholly similar in character. Stripping her Eastern lines of men and guns, as Germany had stripped her Polish and Courland fronts, Austria collected a host in the Trentino and struck south along the Adige and Brenta valleys, the historic pathways of northern invaders, at Verona and Vicenza.

THE DARKEST HOURS FOR THE ALLIES

Austrian success was more immediately great than Germany's. Italian resistance crumbled; the mountains and valleys gained in the earlier attack were lost. Austrian troops victoriously repassed the old frontier and approached the plain of Venetia. For weeks the Austrian advance pushed slowly, steadily forward until Italian apprehension became great and an Italian Ministry fell. It remains a matter for conjecture what might have hap-

pened had not Austrian troops suddenly been recalled by a new event which was to change the whole character of the war and serve as the opening move in the second Allied offensive.

Never in the war had Allied prospects looked darker than on May 1, when the Kut surrender, the Austrian advance, the slow but sure German pressure at Verdun all bore testimony to the strength and to the seeming invincibility of the arms of the Central Powers, and the press talked of a coming German attack upon Russia that should carry to completion the work of the previous summer and achieve at Moscow what had been missed at Warsaw. The Irish Rebellion added to the dismal face of Allied prospects, and even the French press began to murmur at the continued quiescence of British armies and the magnitude of the blood-tax levied upon the sons of the Republic.

V. Germany Loses the Initiative

The Russian victories in Armenia in the late winter, the fall of Erzerum and Trebizond, had been plain warning that Russian strength was gaining. But these events had failed to impress a world watching the terrible struggle before Verdun, and they carried no message to German and Austrian generals, who, confident of Russian exhaustion, continued to send troops from the East to the West and the South.

All through the first four months of the Verdun attack it was plain that Germany reckoned on precipitating a premature offensive by the British, and before their lines she massed most of the troops withdrawn from Russia. As the strain upon the French increased, the British, as was natural, volunteered to begin, but Joffre did not count them yet ready and grimly held the French to the gigantic task on the Heights of the Meuse.

But as Verdun held out, the time approached when Russia would escape from the chains of winter and the Eastern field would again be fit for military operations. Still the world awaited, not a Russian attack, but that Allied offensive which had been, in the minds of the uninformed of neutral and belligerent countries alike, scheduled for the spring; and when it did not come credit was given to German assertions that the Verdun attack had exhausted France.

On June 1, however, there came a sudden awakening. On a vast front extending from the Pripet Marshes to the Rumanian frontier the Russian armies, heralded by tremendous artillery operations, stepped forward, broke the Austrian lines north and south, took the fortresses of Dubno and Lutsk, lost in the preceding summer, and began to sweep the defeated Austrian armies before them in a rout that recalled the worst of the Lemberg disaster.

In a month the total of prisoners claimed by the Russians passed 200,000; it has since reached 300,000. Guns, ammunition, supplies of every sort, fell to the victors. Bukovina was retaken. On the north Kovel was threatened and in the south Kolomea fell, and Cossacks again reached the summit of the Carpathians and began to flow down the Kirilibaba and Jablonitza passes toward the Hungarian Plain.

Once more it was for Germany to come to the rescue of her Austrian ally, and fresh German troops pouring down from the north passed Kovel and halted the Russians, first at the Styr and then, yielding under pressure, retired behind Stokhod, where they still hold. On the Strypa other German troops held firm, but to the south, across the Dniester, the Russians continued to press on, and have only recently slowed down.

RUSSIA'S GREAT OFFENSIVE

Now, after seven weeks, it is too early to forecast the final achievement of the Russian offensive. It goes over into another year, as did the German attack upon Russia of last year, which advanced two hundred miles beyond its July limit before it finally halted. But it is clear that the Russian attack has not yet been checked, that it carries a plain menace for Lemberg and that it has disclosed an Austrian weakness that may be the sign of an approaching collapse. A year ago Berlin talked of a separate peace with a defeated Russia; to-day Petrograd is talking of a separate peace with an exhausted Austria. Berlin was wrong; not improbably Petrograd is wrong; but the change is the thing to be noted.

In the seven weeks of fighting Russia has recovered between 10,000 and 15,000 square miles of territory lost last year, far more territory than Germany holds to ransom from France, a larger area than Belgium. What the moral effect upon Rumania and Bulgaria will be when the Russian victory is finally established it is impossible to forecast; but it is possible to recall the effect in the Balkans of the German victories in Russia a year ago, and Bukovina is under the eyes and in the minds of all Rumanians.

Russian victories automatically ended the Austrian attack upon Italy and Italian armies leaped forward to recover lost ground and are still making progress. Austrian troops were promptly recalled from Albania and from the Balkans, and their going was the signal for new Allied activity about Salonica, which has been accepted as the forerunner of an effort to dispose of Bulgaria, free Serbia and cut the railroad line that binds Berlin to Constantinople and the Turk to the Teuton. Unmistakably, we are soon to have a new campaign in the Balkans—a cam-

paign directed north and south—an effort to restore the iron ring inclosing the Central Powers and isolate the Turk, who may not long endure if he loses the aid of his great German ally.

THE WESTERN ATTACK

Exactly one month after the Russian armies had stepped out in Volhynia and Galicia the French and British armies along the Somme began a great attack, which at the present hour is going forward and still remains but a beginning.

The actual achievement of this Western Drive, still too small in the decisive sense to have any bearing, is in the minds of all who have read the recent newspapers. We must wait weeks and perhaps months before we shall know whether Britain—for the main work must be done by Britain—can repeat in Picardy the Russian achievement in Volhynia and, piercing the German lines, compel the withdrawal of the Teuton from French territory occupied now for nearly two years.

Should the British pierce the German lines for half the distance of the Russian advance upon Kovel by Lutsk, should they recover half the territory already taken by the armies of the Czar, France would be substantially freed of German troops. But, on the other hand, should the British advance be stopped substantially where it now stands, the German success would be as absolute as it was a year ago in Champagne and Artois, and in both instances the small area of recovered territory would have no military value and the minor successes on the firing line, trenches, prisoners and guns taken, would not modify in any respect the absolute victory of Germany on the defensive.

Nor can we now form any estimate of the capacity of the new British armies just beginning their gigantic task. Superficially

they would seem already to have done better than they did at Neuve Chapelle and Loos. We know that they have numbers, guns, munitions, things they have not before had since the Great War began. But it is for another year to determine whether the British armies and officers are yet trained to the point of employing the resources now in their hands.

The French success along the Somme has so far been more considerable than the British, and General Foch has again sustained the great reputation acquired in the decisive phase of the Battle of the Marne, when he defeated the Germans about La Fère Champenoise. An exhausted France has blazed forth in a new victory, wholly local and without present decisive character, to be sure, but a victory making answer to the German claims that France had been put out of the war by the sacrifices exacted at Verdun and that France was now at the end of her resources in men.

VI. Summary

The measure of the meaning of the Second Year of the Great War is perhaps best had by a contrast between the situation as it ends and the situation a year ago. We did not know then what the extent of the German victory in the East was to be. But the year closed while Germany was still going forward in the greatest campaign of the war, and the magnitude and extent of her conquests and victories filled the whole world and gave form to the words in which the comment on the end of the first year was made.

One year later the change is unmistakable. It is the Central Powers, Germany, for she is the heart and head of the war in her own camp, which are on the defensive and the Allies who are advancing. In remote Armenia, in Volhynia, in Galicia, in the Baltic provinces and in Northern France, as well as along the

Alps in the Tretino district, Russian, French, British and Italian troops are attacking, and there is every promise of a new offensive from Salonica aimed at Bulgaria and designed to liberate Serbia.

It is no longer possible, as it was in 1914 and in 1915, for Germany to move troops from east to west or north or south as one field after another became interesting or unimportant in her calculations. On all fronts with equal pressure the flood is beating upon her battle lines, and in the southeastern field a breach has already been opened, which must be closed before long if the consequences are not to be serious for the Central Powers.

Three times, at the Marne, in Russia and in the Verdun attack, Germany has sought to destroy one of her foes, by a single colossal blow to put one of her great opponents out of the reckoning, as Napoleon disposed of Austria at Austerlitz, Prussia at Jena and Russia at Friedland, in the prosperous early days of the imperial drama. Failing in all three attempts, she now sees the third year of the war open with all her enemies standing, with France unbroken, Russia returning to the charge with numbers and efficiency which evoke unfailing wonder in Berlin and undisguised apprehension in Vienna and Budapest. Britain has now millions where she had tens of thousands in August, 1914, and hundreds of thousands a year ago.

GERMANY FAR FROM CONQUERED

As the year ends we have a full measure of Germany's difficulties and dangers, but we have no information to prove her capacity to meet them, and only Allied assertions to support the belief that her resources are exhausted, her economic situation desperate and that the ever growing problem of food continues to worry her statesmen and weaken her people.

We perceive that Germany has lost the offensive, but we are not able to decide whether the loss will prove temporary or permanent. We see that the attack on all sides is made by the Allies, and German and Austrian effort is confined to meeting these attacks, so far successfully in the west and unsuccessfully in the east. We have the allied assertion that German lines are now too extended for German numbers to hold. Of this we lack proof as yet. We have the parallel of the days of the Civil War after Gettysburg frequently called to our mind, and Joffre, following Delacroix, has likened Verdun to Gettysburg. But of these things there is yet no proof, save only as we have the German confession that on all fronts German troops and the troops of Germany's allies are outnumbered. This, after all, must be patent, given the resources in men of the great nations combined against the Central Powers and the enormous casualty lists that Austria and Germany have suffered, lists that must now in killed, wounded, captured and incapacitated far pass the 7,000,000 mark.

Yet if the friends of the Allies now turn to the parallel of the Confederacy it is plain that with equal justice the Germans may point to the achievements of Frederick the Great and the heroic and successful resistance of Prussia in the Seven Years' War, when the odds were far greater and the resources of Frederick insignificant in comparison to those of his many foes. We may say with justice that in losing the offensive, the initiative, if it be permanently lost, in failing to put out one of her enemies before all were equally prepared, Germany failed to win the war on German terms, failed to conquer, and the second year of the war has seen the coming of the failure. But this is a long way from saying that Germany can be conquered.

NO PEACE THIS YEAR

Bernhardi forecast German defeat if Germany failed to eliminate one of her great opponents before all were in the field with equal preparation. But Bernhardi's prophecy is old, and the war has abolished many articles of faith in the minds of all observers, neutral and belligerent. One can say with absolute accuracy that as the year ends there is unmistakable evidence that a new phase has begun, the phase dominated by Allied attack upon Germany, as the preceding two years have been dominated by the great German offensive combinations.

It follows that the year is ending without the smallest promise of peace. There is no prospect that the Allies will be able between now and winter to win a victory that will bring Germany to her knees. There is no present promise that Germany will be able to regain the initiative and in the same time accomplish what she failed to accomplish at the Marne and about Vilna. Allied successes, small as they are, will hold out the promise to the Allies of a real victory next year. German resistance, maintained as it now is, will sustain the German belief that Germany should continue the war until she is able to make a peace conforming to the extent of the war map.

Every outward evidence that a reasonable man can accept points to another year of war, to the fulfillment of Kitchener's forecast of a three year's war. Nothing is yet decided save that Germany has failed to crush France or Russia and to compel Britain to ask peace by menaces directed on land at Egypt and India and on water at the sea-borne trade of Britain by the submarine. Possessing Belgium, thousands of square miles of Northern France, all of Poland, most of the Baltic provinces and much of Volhynia, the Central Powers still have a tremendous booty, which is not yet counterbalanced by Germany's lost colonies and vanished sea trade.

Finally, holding Serbia and having enlisted Bulgaria and Turkey, Germany possesses the keys to that "place in the sun" for which her statesmen have long yearned, and no man can believe that she will surrender them and forsake her allies until she has suffered defeats which are not yet to be forecast. Until the gateway to the Near East is bolted at the Danube again talk of peace is futile short of that hour when exhaustion comes, and that is still far away. It is more war, not peace, that the year-end promises—this is unmistakable.

The Great War—Third Year

MEASURED by the expectations on the second anniversary of the outbreak of the World War, there is no mistaking the fact that the third year has been a bitter disappointment to the Allies. Recall for a moment the situation on the first of August, 1916. At that moment the Russian offensive in Bukowina and Galicia had surpassed all previous achievements in trench warfare on the Allied side. The armies of Brusiloff were pushing forward still, and Kovel and Lemberg seemed equally in danger. The Russian attack had begun in June. All through July the British and the French at the Somme had pounded on, taking thousands of prisoners, many guns, and at last were making an appreciable change in the battle lines in France. On August 1 the Italian guns were already active, preparing for that attack which in a few days was to win Gorizia. Already the world began to suspect that Rumania was on the point of entering the Great War. Men began to talk of the liberation of France, the fall of Trieste and of Lemberg and the restoration of Allied fortunes.

It is clear now that none of these expectations were to be realized in the next year, and it is equally clear that there never was any great chance of their being realized. In the first and second years of the war Germany had created that Mitteleuropa which was the dream of her politicians, of her statesmen and of her soldiers for twenty years before the outbreak of the war, and in 1916-'17 there was still lacking to the Allied arms the strength to break down the trench lines which Germany had stretched along her frontiers and beyond, as Rome erected similar fence lines to hold back the barbarians between the Rhine and the Danube.

We saw in this year 1916 one hope after another crushed:

Rumania laid in ruins; the Russian offensive beaten down; the Allied drive for Cambrai, St. Quentin, Douai stopped on the western side of Bapaume.

And at the end one saw Germany proposing peace, while the whole world for the first time began to question whether, after all, it was possible to conquer Germany; whether, after all, a draw in battle and a white peace were not the limits of possibility.

One more disappointment there was—the Russian Revolution, which was hailed as restoring Russia's battle line to the Allies and as disposing of the corrupt Romanoff agents and tools who sought to make their peace with Germany and betray the Allied cause. Instead, through long weeks we saw Russia, having been redeemed by revolution, hesitant, doubtful as to whether she should retake her place in the battle line, while goings and comings between Russians and Germans, fraternizing between Russian and German soldiers at the front, all suggested that a separate peace was at hand.

As the present year ends we see the turn of the tide. The United States has entered the war, bringing vast resources of men and money. Russia has returned, at least temporarily, to the firing line. In Germany a political unrest is now claiming attention, and for the first time there is a possibility that what has happened in Russia may, in some measure, happen in Germany, and that those who made the war and would carry it on may be separated from the people, who, while they consented to the war, have grown weary of its sacrifices.

Of the year 1916-'17 one may perhaps say accurately that the beginning and the end were the most hopeful moments for the Allied cause. Between these two points lie some of the bitterest disappointments in military history.

First among the operations of importance in the latter half of last year was the Battle of the Somme. It had proceeded with fury all through July. When the third year of the war opened it remained still a baffling puzzle to all who observed it at a distance. With relatively little change in ground, the British and the French armies fought it out for moral supremacy. The new British army, green, not yet trained in modern warfare or modern weapons, passed through the furnace from July to November, from the bloody repulse of Gommecourt to the triumphant success of Beaumont Hamel.

When the Battle of the Somme was over the British army felt itself more than the master of the German army. With the French it had taken 85,000 prisoners north and south of the Somme, and the British share was the larger. It had pushed the Germans back in places six or seven miles, and in the following spring the German retreat was to demonstrate that the Battle of the Somme had imperilled German security from Arras to Soissons. Had the weather been more favorable probably the retreat would have come last fall, but when it did come it demonstrated the superiority of the new British army over what was left of the old German army—a superiority unmistakable, but yet far from sufficient to insure a speedy decision.

While the Battle of the Somme was at its height, Italy struck out toward Gorizia in August, pushed forward across the Isonzo River, climbed up onto the Carso Plateau, took thousands of Austrian prisoners, captured the city of Gorizia and won the first great military battle in the history of united Italy. Yet there was no morrow to this success. On their rearward lines the Austrians checked the Italians. Trench warfare was resumed. Trieste was not captured, nor has it fallen yet, although the spring has seen a new Italian offensive.

While the Italian attack was being carried forward there broke out in Bukowina and Southern Galicia a new Brusiloff stroke. Pushing forward south of the Dniester from Czernowitz to Stanislau—over eighty-five miles—the Russians now threatened Lemberg from the south as they had threatened it from Lutsk and Brody on the north in June. In ten days they captured more than 80,000 prisoners, bringing their total captures for their Eastern offensive from June 1 to 400,000. Never in the course of the whole war had the Allied outlook seemed so propitious as it did in August and September, 1916. And in this time came the sudden and dramatic entrance of Rumania into the battle line. What everybody had long expected when it came surprised the world. Suddenly Rumania declared war and sent her armies across the Transylvanian Alps into Hungarian territory. For several weeks there followed brilliant advances by the Rumanians. Cities and towns fell; more than a third of Transylvania—all that section which lies between the outspread arms of Moldavia and Wallachia—fell to the new belligerent.

But then came the heavy change. Suddenly a great Turco-Bulgar-German army from the south of the Danube commanded by the redoubtable Mackensen, who had won the Dunajec the year before, began to push forward into the Dobrodja, driving before it the weak Rumanian guards, until it passed the railroad line going from Constanza to Bucharest, and occupied the province of Dobrudja, which had long been the chief of Bulgarian ambition.

Worse was now to follow. Under Falkenhayn, who had been succeeded by Hindenburg as chief of staff, a great German army pushed southward, defeated the Rumanian army in Transylvania heavily, and then suddenly, almost without warning, burst into the plains of Rumania through the Transylvania passes. Almost before the world had realized what had happened, armies

from the south and the north were encircling Bucharest and routed Rumanian armies were fleeing eastward toward Russia, while Ferdinand, himself a Hohenzollern, had taken the road to exile followed by so many kings in this struggle.

There never was any more swift, sure, decisive victory in military history than that of the Germans over Rumania. It came at a point when German prospects seemed desperate. It was won by heavy artillery against small guns. It was won by veteran troops against ill-trained recruits. It was won by a great nation which had been three years at war against a small nation which had had no war training. But nothing could rob it of its moral effect. All over the world the fall of Bucharest was taken as an authentic sign, if not of German victory, at least of the fact that Germany could not be conquered.

This Balkan episode was terminated by a minor effort on the part of Sarrail's army from Salonica, which did, in fact, reach and pass Monastir, but there it stood and still stands. All hope and possibility that the Balkans had held out for the Allies in 1914 and 1915, and finally in 1916, when Rumania came in, had now vanished. Rumania and Serbia, which had allied themselves with the enemies of Germany, were in ruins, Serbia totally in the hands of the enemy, Rumania for the greater part, and little Montenegro shared the Serbian ruin. Bulgaria had decided for the Central Powers, and her armies now occupied provinces torn from her at Bucharest, and, in addition, lands long coveted. In Greece all that the King could do was done for Germany. A Greek garrison surrendered Greek cities and Greek provinces to the Bulgar, and King Constantine contemplated a blow in the rear against Sarrail's army at Monastir.

It was at this time that Germany, choosing her moment with supreme skill, proposed that there should be peace, opening the way

to an end of the conflict which should not be unprofitable to her. But this German offer was rejected. The Allies returned to the war, having clearly foreshadowed a determination to fight on until the Mitteleuropa that Germany had created from Berlin to Bagdad and from the Meuse to the Dwina was destroyed.

Failing thus to achieve her end by negotiation, Germany had recourse to her last remaining weapon, the submarine. She was now outnumbered in Europe on every front. She was outgunned in the West. Her material resources were shrinking at home. Her future economic prosperity was being doomed as one nation after another entered the coalition against her and became participants equally in arrangements that would last after the war. On February 1 Germany announced that she purposed to sink all ships, with exceptions that were only illusory and, for the United States, humiliating. The German decision meant one thing. It meant that the Germans believed that only by one method could they win the war. They could no longer win it by military decisions, although they might be able to hold their lines for long months, perhaps for years. It meant that, the power of the offensive on land having passed away from them, they would have recourse to an offensive on the seas.

Hardly had the German decision been made when Russia was temporarily eliminated from the war by an internal revolution which shook to the very bottom all her social and military organizations, and the entrance of the United States into the war on April 6 could not seem to the Germans to be a counterpoise for the retirement of Russia.

In April of this year Germany could again expect, if not the triumph looked for at the beginning of the war, if not the decision expected at Verdun, still a substantial victory following a separate peace with Russia and preceding the time when the United States

could arrive with new arms on the field of battle. And there was throughout Germany a profound optimism, in the midst of misery, based upon the hope held out by the submarine programme and by the prospect of a separate peace with Russia.

What has happened since we all know. As the campaigning season approached and the German army was forced to retire from Arras to Soissons, giving over the ground threatened by the British and the French offensive at the Somme—threatened primarily by the expansion of the British lines and by the never ending intensity of British artillery pounding—we saw at last an actual and considerable change on the Western front. Nearly a thousand square miles of French territory were evacuated, and there was a forward move of the Allies unequalled since the Marne.

Yet the limits of this gain were clearly indicated. By leaving a district from ten to fifteen miles deep the Germans had postponed any possible attack on this front for many months. They had turned the country into a desert. They had destroyed every means of communication, every village. They had hacked down fruit trees and destroyed the magnificent old trees along the roads. The consequence of this was that from the Aisne to the Cojeul, from Soissons almost to Arras, there had been created before the new German line a moat of desolation, which had first to be passed by the builders of British railroads before the army could arrive. Now, after four months, there has still been no attack on this front, save only around Arras.

Yet this Arras offensive, which flamed forth on April 9, demonstrated a new superiority of British arms and British weapons still unsuspected. A gain of five miles at the maximum on a front of fifteen, 22,000 prisoners and more than 200 guns, many of them heavy—these were the fruits of the first British offensive of 1917,

compared with the far more dearly purchased and, by comparison, meagre gains of the preceding year.

And in June we had a new and complete success, retaking all the heights vital to the defence of the German lines as they existed and necessary to the Allies as the basis for a new offensive. Seven thousand prisoners and many guns—a quick, smashing triumph accomplished with the accuracy of an engineering experiment. This was the third Battle of Ypres and this was the final demonstration of British superiority over the Germans—a superiority no longer questioned, but not yet sufficient to overcome the advantages of the defensive in the endless lines of trenches and the enormous amount of machine guns which the Germans had prepared.

Turning to the battle between the French and the Germans, the picture is not the same. When the present war year opened the French before Verdun were standing almost in their last ditch. Vaux had fallen in June, and the Germans had reached the ditch of Souville. A little further gain, and it seemed as if, after all, Verdun would terminate in a German victory.

The Allied offensive at the Somme in July prevented this, but it was not until August that German pressure at Verdun began to fall off, and in October and November two French offensives retook Douaumont and Vaux, cleared the circle of hills and regained the vital ground lost in February and March of 1916. December saw the finish of the Verdun episode. A great victory had been won.

In the two offensives about Verdun of October and November the French took 18,000 prisoners and many guns, and the victory brought the victor, General Vivelle, to the attention of the world. Joffre was visibly weary, and in due course of time he took the rôle of Marshal of France, and Nivelle succeeded him as commander in chief. Vivelle's success at Verdun raised hopes that

he would be able to expand this success on a wider front. France, so long weary, looked forward to the campaign of 1917 with much expectation.

This expectation was not realized. The French offensive, beginning on the 16th of April, was one of the most cruel disappointments of all to the French people. Important ground was brilliantly taken. Nearly 30,000 prisoners, more than 100 guns of one sort or another, were captured. But the casualties were terrific, and the impossibility of a sweeping advance was soon recognized. Nivelle and Magin had expected to enter Laon, but nine miles from Laon their advance was checked. They had planned to take Brimont, but Brimont still holds out. They had planned to disblock Rheims, but thousands of shells are falling each week into the martyred city.

The result was another staff change. Pétain came back to command the French army. The French army passed from the offensive to the defensive, and the French people sat down grimly to endure another disappointment and another winter of war. By the first of July the French dead numbered a million; the dead and those permanently eliminated from the firing line passed two millions, and one could say that upward of a third of the man power of France had been used up.

After the revolution Russia long lingered in the throes of social agitation and domestic disorder. It was not until July that there was a sudden righting, and a Russian offensive, first north and then south of the Dniester, revived a part—but only a part—of the glory of 1916. The Allies who had expected nothing, rejoiced at a Russian victory, but even as it perceived the greatness and the moral value of the Russian offensive, the entire opinion of the world recognized the difficulties in front of another sustained effort. After taking nearly 40,000 prisoners and a vast store of

material—after reaching and passing the Austrian headquarters at Kalusz—the Russian advance was stopped at the Lomnica River in the third week of July, where it remains when these lines are written.

We have here, then, the measure of the year of war. First of all, a grand concentric attack upon the Central Powers, begun by the Russians in Volhynia and Galicia, taken up by the British and French at the Somme, carried on by Italy at Gorizia, and brought to a final climax by new Russian efforts in Galicia and the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania. Then following the shining triumph of the Germans in Rumania. Not only had they escaped deadly peril on all fronts, but in the moment of their greatest danger the Germans had levelled a fatal stroke against a new foe.

The Allied offensive of 1917 was changed in its character, if not prevented, by Russia's collapse. We have not yet seen and we may not see such a general attack as came last year. We may see a perpetuation of the calm until the new campaign of 1918, when newly organized American armies and reorganized Russian troops may be available. Or we may see one or more British offensives like Arras and the third Ypres. But despite Russia's return to the charge, it seems to me unlikely that there will be repeated the efforts of last summer to beat upon every front at the same time. It must be recognized that were peace to come to-day on the map of Europe the German victory would be unmistakable. Provinces, principalities, cities, swept into the German lap in the campaign of 1914 and 1915, remain there still. Even the British offensive which rewon Bagdad and wiped out the mess of Kut-el-Amara has only touched the fringe of Germany's Mitteleuropa. Another British army, at the door of the Holy Land, is still but a remote threat. From Antwerp and Brussels to Warsaw and Vilna; from

Hamburg and Bremen to the marshes of Jerusalem and to the upper reaches of the Euphrates, the German will prevail.

The campaign of 1916 was an effort to break down the walls of the great Central European empire which Germany and her allies had constructed. As such it was a failure. As such the campaigns since have been failures. The edifice still stands, and if the submarine threat, which was to bring Britain to her knees in three months, had failed too, one must at least confess that the hope of starving Germany has again been postponed another year, and whatever the extent of the new harvest, Germany has at least lasted to it.

There remains the question whether the Germans will now content themselves to evacuate the conquered lines—to return to the conditions of 1914—or whether they will insist upon preserving their Middle Europe. With a Germany in possession of what Germany now holds the Allies cannot make peace. Any peace would be but a preparation for a world domination by Germany. The military problem of the campaign of 1917-'18 is unmistakable. It must be to break in the dikes erected about this Central European empire. Failing this, it must be to apply steadily and unceasingly such pressure on the outside that the demands for peace within shall rise until they can no longer be silenced. That Germany is war weary no one can doubt. That Germany is so war weary that she is prepared now to surrender her conquered lands and that she is also prepared to surrender Alsace-Lorraine, indemnify Belgium, give over German Poland seems to me unlikely in the extreme.

Actually, the German General Staff set forth for itself in July and August, 1916, the task of holding through, and one is obliged to recognize that, however terrible the strain, on August 1, 1917, the German is still holding through. Nor can one mistake

the gravity of the new submarine war. Germany has been wrong in believing that after three months of unrestricted submarine warfare England would be brought to her knees, but there are few naval experts who believe that if the submarine ravages continue unrestricted, England can fight much after October, 1918, or fail to make peace by negotiation within a brief period after that date.

For myself, I am satisfied that we are entering into the last year of the war. We may have a military decision between now and the end of the campaigning season of next year. If we do not, I do not believe the war will be ended by a military decision. We shall not have a military decision if Russia quits the battle line and the United States fails to make a prompt and great effort, supplying in some part the Russian defection.

I believe a military victory must now come to the Allies, if Russia and the United States do their part. I believe it may come to the Allies if the United States measures up to her great task and her obvious duty. But I do not believe that the element of time is any longer an ally of the enemies of the Central Powers. I believe that unless the submarine menace is ended the Allies cannot go longer than the end of next year. And I do not believe that without great American reinforcements a military decision will be had.

The German army is no longer the army of 1914. German resources are fading and falling. Yet during the war of the Spanish Succession Louis XIV faced the great coalition under equal disadvantages and managed to avoid the partition of his country and to achieve a peace without indemnity or annexation. If the Germans can last until the snow flies next autumn they may be able to do the same thing. Whether they will be able to do this or not depends very largely upon the United States and Russia, and only a blind and foolish man, whatever his hopes, would place great reliance upon Russia.








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